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The autornation of contract negotiation has the potential to change the way B2C and 
B2B trade takes place. For all its prOlnise however, contract negotiation between 
businesses (for i"nstance, e-Procurement) is still not conducted automatically. The au-
tomation of contract negotiation for e-comlnerce trade is complicated by three factors. 
Firstly, the majority of contract negotiation is multi-issue. Secondly, dynamic and 
uncertain contextual information is typically crucial for decision making in the negoti-
ation. Finally, business relationships that evolve from negotiation need to be accounted 
for. 
One observation made is that research in autornating negotiation has not ade-
quately addressed the role that uncertainty plays in decision making. Further rnore, 
understanding the importance of information for reducing this uncertainty is funda-
mental to designing software that is capable of modeling and valuing relationships that 
evolve frOlll negotiation. 
In light of this, this dissertation proposes an architecture design for an agent that 
makes negotiation decisions based on the value of information that it gives away and 
receives, where this value is derived from the arnount of uncertainty the information 
reduces. It is argued that an agent that values information in this way delivers superior 
performance in B2B-style negotiations than an agent that is not able to do so. 
The performance of an agent constructed with this architecture is evaluated with 
a series of bilateral negotiation simulations. An assessrnent is made on the behaviour 
of this agent, and a comparison is rnade between a strategy where decisions are made 
III 
based on information exchange, and a strategy where decisions are made based on a 
valuation on outcOlnes. 
This architecture design is extended to a particular instance of B2B negotiation --
integrative negotiation. In integrative negotiation, goals form part of the negotiation 
decision making apparatus. For the architecture design extension, this dissertation 
outlines integrative negotiation nonns described by sociological research in real world 
negotiation. An agent constructed with this architecture is evaluated to assess its 
behaviour in real world B2B-style negotiations. 
The dissertation concludes that, by modeling the uncertainty reduced by the COIn-
lllunication of information, an agent is able to value the communicative interactions 
between itself and another agent. Business relationships are founded upon communi-
cation, and when an agent is capable of valuing its communicative interaction, then it 
is capable of lllodeling aspects of business relationships that evolve from negotiation. 
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